55 Railway Accidents and a Factory Visit: A Lesson in the Accountability Gap
**Core answer:** Pakistan Railways recorded more than 55 accidents since 1 January 2025, including at least seven named derailments clustered between 2 and 27 September, despite federal safety directives. No independent root-cause investigation has been publicly attributed to any incident. **Key facts:** - More than 55 accidents were recorded from 1 January to late September, disclosed by anonymous railway sources rather than an official statement. - Seven named incidents include Rawal Express, Khyber Mail, Rahman Baba Express, and repeated coal-train derailments at Yusufwala. - Sukkur, Karachi and Multan divisions were identified as the highest-incident zones, correlating with heavy freight corridors. - The Federal Minister for Railways inspected Mughalpura steel shop and spectro laboratory, addressing component quality but not track, signalling or operating discipline. - Sabotage incidents, including a Quetta shuttle attack damaging three coaches, are aggregated into the same accident count as mechanical derailments. **Source attribution:** The Express Tribune, "Railways logs over 55 accidents this year," published late September 2025. | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Related Q&A:** Q: How many railway accidents did Pakistan record this year? A: More than 55 accidents were recorded since 1 January, per anonymous railway sources cited by The Express Tribune. Q: Which railway divisions reported the most accidents? A: Sukkur, Karachi and Multan divisions were identified as the highest-incident zones, according to railway sources. Q: Did the railway minister order a safety investigation? A: The minister issued strict safety and quality instructions and inspected Mughalpura manufacturing facilities, but no independent incident investigation was publicly referenced.
On 27 September, while seven derailments had been recorded within less than four weeks, the Federal Minister for Railways stood inside a steel shop in Mughalpura, observing an electric arc furnace and a spectro laboratory. The photograph was handsome. It was tidy. And it told a completely different story from the more than 55 railway accidents recorded since 1 January that railway sources themselves had confirmed.
This is the starting point of any serious analysis of the national railway system: the gap between directive and outcome. The minister issued strict instructions on safety and quality standards. Those instructions exist. But after those instructions, trains kept derailing. Rawal Express lost its engine and two coaches. The coal train at Yusufwala came off the rails. Khyber Mail met trouble. Rahman Baba Express met trouble. A shuttle service at Quetta was sabotaged, three coaches damaged. Each incident is a line in a table of statistics, and not one line carries a name attached to responsibility.
What stands out is not the number 55. What stands out is that not a single independent investigation is referenced for any one of those incidents.
The original report provides a sample of seven incidents with specific dates and locations. Six of the seven fall between 2 September and 27 September. A cluster of failures compressed into a single month, not evenly distributed across the year. When incidents cluster rather than scatter, the probability that they share a common root cause rises substantially: the same pool of rolling stock, the same maintenance cycle, the same corridor. Railway sources identify Sukkur, Karachi and Multan as the highest-incident zones. Those are also the heaviest freight corridors, where coal trains pass continuously. High axle load meeting degraded infrastructure is a familiar equation in railway engineering, and it produces exactly the clustering pattern now visible.
But there is a larger problem in how the number itself is presented. "More than 55 accidents" is an absolute count with no denominator. No train-kilometres, no traffic volume, no severity weighting, and above all no prior-year comparison figure. An absolute count cannot establish a trend. It does not prove safety is deteriorating, and it does not prove safety has improved. It proves one thing only: that a large number of incidents are occurring, and that they are being counted by people who will not give their names.

This is where classification integrity matters. Within that same number of 55, two entirely different kinds of failure are being aggregated. The first is technical failure: derailment caused by track, by rolling stock, by signalling. The second is deliberate sabotage, such as the Quetta shuttle incident in which three coaches were damaged. Sabotage is a security event. Infrastructure derailment is a maintenance event. Lumping them into one column inflates the apparent maintenance-degradation signal and corrupts the diagnostic value of the entire statistic. If the safety budget is allocated on the basis of 55 without separating cause classes, money flows into maintenance while the security budget stays flat, and the number keeps climbing.
The damage data carries the same defect. The report speaks of "millions of rupees" in damage to railway infrastructure, but with no specific figure, no source, no breakdown, and no time frame. A quantitative claim with no quantitative content is a claim that cannot be verified. Meanwhile the opportunity cost of line blockage on a corridor that also carries coal freight is not mentioned at all. That is the largest economic blind spot: incidents involving coal trains at Yusufwala recur, and each recurrence is a disruption to an energy supply chain.

On the passenger side, the report records fear. But read the quotation closely, and it is not fear. It is resignation. "How can we avoid it, it's essential." That sentence does not generate political pressure. It cancels political pressure. A frightened public protests. A resigned public keeps buying tickets and keeps absorbing risk involuntarily. Because there is no alternative mode of transport, demand is inelastic, and risk becomes something passengers must absorb rather than choose. Risk that cannot be avoided by exit must be reduced by regulation. And regulation is precisely what is being shown to fail.
I have followed public infrastructure crisis cycles for many years, and the pattern repeats almost perfectly. When a system has no independent investigation mechanism, each incident is not an incident that gets closed. It is an incident that gets re-rolled. Risk is not retired; it is re-rolled for the next train. Seven named incidents, more than 55 counted, and not one person named as responsible for any of them. That is not an operational fault. That is governance architecture.
And here is where I could be wrong. If an internal investigation mechanism exists and functions but is inaccessible to the press, then the conclusion about an accountability gap downgrades to an information gap. If the Mughalpura factory visit genuinely reflects a tightening of component quality control, with the spectro laboratory as evidence of a substantive inspection process, then component-failure incidents could decline over the following twelve months. That is the most optimistic scenario, and it is entirely possible. But even then, the inspection scope is narrower than the problem. A steel shop tests component quality. It does not test track condition, it does not test signalling systems, it does not test operating discipline. Those three are the most common causes of derailment across the global railway industry.
There is one structural detail about the article I cannot pass over. The lede is the factory visit. The figure of 55 accidents sits in the third paragraph. The most consequential fact is buried behind a communications ritual. Placing a photograph of the minister in a steel shop above a national safety crisis is an editorial choice, and that choice softens the story's impact in exactly the way a soft-news frame softens hard news. The obvious question was not asked: what does the minister think of 55 accidents following his own safety directive? The report carries no response from the ministry at all. No spokesperson. No statement. That silence is itself a datapoint.

What strikes me most structurally is the contrast between two information streams. Railway officials offer reassuring assessments to the public. Anonymous railway sources supply the figure of 55 accidents. Neither party is on record under their own name. Accountability requires attribution, and attribution is being avoided systematically. This is not a communications failure. This is a defensive mechanism operating exactly as designed.
On risk, the picture is fairly clear. Three named passenger services were involved in incidents, which means this is not a freight-only problem. With more than 55 incidents in nine months, the base rate for a fatality-escalation event is high, and no mechanism is recorded that blocks that escalation path. The greatest risk is not an unprecedented one. Derailment on divisions already identified as hotspots, with a documented incident history, is a known risk. A known risk being managed by reassurance is the most severe category in any assessment framework.
At 61, I no longer have time for reassurance without figures. A railway is not a football club that can sack its manager after three defeats. There is no transfer window to patch the defence, no league table to measure position, and no referee to blow the whistle when a coach slips off the rails. But the principle is identical: a system with no mechanism for attributing responsibility will never correct itself, because nobody bears the consequence of not correcting it. What would happen if this national railway system, instead of being measured by the number of accidents, were measured by the number of accidents with an independent investigation completed within thirty days? The second number, I suspect, would be close to zero. And when a system can survive with that second number close to zero, the problem is no longer the rails.
